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1. Introduction
The focus of this article is on the process of individual firm growth on
theadjustment path during thetransition from acentrally planned to amar-
ket based economy. The empirical analysis of firm behavior is based on data
covering all medium and large industrial firms from Slovak industry du-
ring the period of 1993 to 1996. At the beginning of 1993 major macroeco-
nomic and institutional reforms were in place.1 Firms were facing a rela-
tively standard competitive environment, the economic model of Slovakia
was converging to the model of a small open economy. Firms were exposed
to competition from the world markets. 1993 was the beginning of the exis-
tence of the independent state, implying a shift of the general focus of the re-
form program. From 1993 to 1996 about 30 % percent of state ownership
shifted to private hands. The economy started to recover showing signs of
economic growth and unemployment declined, all this despite a general
slowdown in the reform process.
While the economic environment during the period of analysis was still
influenced by the process of privatization and restructuring, a number of
industrial firms already operated within new corporate and ownership
structures facing fairly competitive conditions. The discussion in transi-
tional literature proposes hypothesis on the role of characteristics such as
a firm’s initial size, ownership, corporate structure, in determining its po-
tential to grow. It is often assumed that private companies grow faster or
that large companies are more likely to survive in the business. Ad hoc ex-
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1 In the preceding years from 1990 to 1993 major macroeconomic and institutional reforms took
place establishing the essential mechanisms of market economy. Industry, traditionally oriented
towards heavy industry, was hit seriously having lost traditional buyers as themarkets of theold
system of Comecon (Council of Mutual and Economic Assistance) disappeared. Privatization was
launched and from 1990 to 1992 10 % percent of the economy shifted from private to the pub-
lic sector. This period is often referred to as the initial period of transition. The events of eco-
nomic and institutional reforms during the initial period of transition included e.g.: in 1990:
price liberalization, establishment of two-tier banking system, in 1991: adoption of competition
and bankruptcy laws, launch of small-scale privatization and first wave of large-scale privati-
zation; 1992: new government introducing changes into the general concept of reform and pri-
vatization, second wave of large-scale privatizations, 1993: foundation of independent Slovak
Republic.amination of aggregate statistics, indeed suggests such patterns that are
then easily assumed to hold and become generally accepted. It is important
to provide conceptual framework to analyze the effects within the premises
of current economic analysis and find out whether we may confirm the pre-
sence of such effects on the firm growth process. In what follows we pro-
pose a standard econometric analysis of the firm growth relationship with
emphasis on the particularities of panel data, adjusting for survival effect
and providing the appropriate framework to analyze the presence of owner-
ship/corporate structure effects.
Firm growth is a widely addressed issue in the context of market struc-
ture literature. Both theoretical and empirical works have focused on
the analysis of determinants of a firm’s growth in order to understand 
the behavior of firms and consequently the resulting market structure.2
The transition from centrally planned to a market economy is yet another
setting for analysis of the firm growth process. The process of transition im-
plies that firms are on the adjustment path as opposed to an equilibrium
state and we are thus not observing an equilibrium distribution of firms.
The empirical evidence on the firm growth process provides useful frame-
work for understanding the growth behavior of firms restructuring to ad-
just to new, competitive environment.
The main issues to be addressed by the empirical analysis of firm growth
determinants may be formulated along these issues. Do we observe any spe-
cific pattern of firm growth – firm size relationship? Are there systematic
effects of firm characteristics on its performance in terms of growth, or other-
wise stated in constituting a firm’s demand for labor? In particular, what
is the role of firm characteristics such as ownership and corporate gover-
nance? Finally, we are interested in the role of market structure, whether
we can see that firms in highly concentrated sectors have more space to
grow as suggested by market structure literature. We analyze separately
the character of the firm turnover process and the impact this process has
on the sample selection in the firm growth analysis.
The structure of the article is as follows. In the following section we dis-
cuss the character of data used for estimated relationship, together with
a brief review of the current literature on the issue. We then present
the main ideas of our model together with treatment of the most important
econometric problems related to the estimation. In section III we discuss
the results of the survival analysis, which is a complementary analysis to
the main growth relationship. The survival model though carries important
information on the character of the turnover process of firms engaging in
privatization and restructuring. Finally, in section IV, we discuss the main
results and assess the determinants of firm growth relationship.
2. Data and Conceptual Framework
The empirical analysis is based on data of industrial firms in Slovakia
during the period of transition from 1993 to 1996. Data was gathered by
437 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
2 See (Sutton, 1997) for a review on the subject.the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic and is representative for Slo-
vak industrial firms with at least 25 employees.3 It covers 80 % of both in-
dustrial employment and production in the given period. The industry it-
self4 represents more than about one third of the total employment and
GDP.5
The structure of the industrial sector was at the beginning of the transi-
tion characterized by distorted factor and product prices, prevailing low
value added production, firms facing soft budget constraints, further dis-
torting managerial decision making within a state enterprise governance
form. The state owned enterprises were typically large, as a result of the ge-
neral tendency towards vertically integrated industrial firms within a cen-
tral plan system. While the first years of transition, from 1990 to 1992, were
devoted to the introduction of the reforms at a macroeconomic level, the fol-
lowing years the most important agenda was related to the process of pri-
vatization and restructuring. The structural change is explicitly implied by
the implementation of the program of privatization and related events.
The privatization itself was designed in 1990 but most industrial firms par-
ticipated in large scale privatization, effectively launched in 1992 with first
results in 1993. It is reasonable to believe that at the beginning of the ana-
lyzed period, in early 1993, many firms were in some stage of a privatiza-
tion process. Some firms have changed owners and some started to engage
in the restructuring process. The ownership structure of industrial firms
changed during privatization. While in 1993 40 % of all firms in our data
were private and 52 % state, in 1996 70 % are in private hands and only
16 % remained under state ownership. In terms of employment represented
by these firms, the figures are less dramatic as state firms are the large
ones and state firms in 1996 represent 35 % of employment and 39 % of
output in our data. The Slovak industrial sector encountered a massive in-
crease in the number of firms during the initial years from 1989 to 1992.
The number of industrial firms with at least 25 employees from 1989 to
1992 rose ten times.6 Based on (Lizal – Singer – Svejnar, 1995, 2001), these
increases are partially attributable to theprocess of breaking-up of thelarge
state owned enterprises. Large industrial enterprises typically break up
and result in a number of spin-offs. Due to the practice of vertical integra-
tion in the previous centrally planned systems, the spin-offs may operate
in different segments of industry than their parent firm. The process of
changes in the size structure continued also through 1993. From 1993 to
1996, the number of firms increased by half (46 %). The growth of firms
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3 As of 1997, the data was modified to cover firms with at least 20 employees. This introduces
discontinuity in the data and complicates the possibility of extending the analysis for following
years.
4 excluding construction
5 For technical details on data and related data adjustments see chapter III in (Studená, 2003).
6 The number of firms rose from 158 in 1989 to 1059 firms in 1992, based on SOSR 1993–1997,
information on the corresponding sample of industrial firms with at least 25 employees. The in-
creases in the number of small and micro-firms are even more dramatic, e.g. the number of
small industrial firms (<25 employees) rose between 1994 and 1995 by 27 % compared to 17 %
entrance rate of medium and large firms (>=25 employees) – source: SOSR 1995, 1996 for small
firms. The numbers of small firms are not available for previous years.thus slowed considerably. This may be considered as an indication that
the growth rate is converging to the rate corresponding to a standard de-
veloped market.7 The character of the process of industrial structure de-
velopment may be further investigated through the firm growth relation-
ship.
2.1 Model
The interest in firm growth has generated a broad strand of economic re-
search mainly in the context of market structure oriented research. Since
1931 when Gibrat proposed his hypothesis that firm growth is independent
from size both theoretical and empirical works attempted to explain or
refuse validity of such relationship between firm growth and size.8 The re-
cent empirical evidence on the validity of Gibrat’s law implying firm growth
is independent from size is diverse. Hall (1987) finds firm growth is inde-
pendent from size only for large firms; Evans (1987a,b) finds that firm
growth decreases with size. As from afirm’scharacteristics, Evans (1987a,b)
reports firm growth decreases with age as well as Dunne et al. (1989). All
mentioned authors/works deal with the robustness of results to the sample
selection problem.9
Firm growth in the transition process is assessed theoretically in the con-
text of the models of labor reallocation as these have implications for de-
terminants of net employment creation (Aghion – Blanchard, 1994), (Bri-
xiova, 1997), (Castanheira – Roland, 2000). The hypothesis of the superior
behavior of privately owned firms in growth dynamics is empirically as-
sessed in the firm growth analyses of transition economies. (Konings et al.,
1996), (Konings, 1997), (Bilsen – Konings, 1998), (Faggio – Konings, 2001)
cover mostly Central and Eastern European countries in transition and deal
mainly with the role of firm characteristics in determining the firm growth.
Special attention is paid to the role of private ownership as determinant of
a superior firm behavior as reflected in the potential to grow.
When analyzing the general patterns of the firm growth determinants,
the main issues may be summarized as i) the relationship between firm
growth and its size (or validity of Gibrat’slaw); ii) relationship of firm growth
to firm characteristics; iii) the determinants of the probability of a firm sur-
vival; iv) appropriateness of particular models. In what follows we present
the main ideas of our model and the way we deal with the problems stated
above.
The firm growth relationship may be in general stated (Evans, 1987a) as:
Si,t+d = G[(Si,t; Xi,t]
d Si,t et (1)
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7 See chapter II in (Studená, 2003).
8 For theoretical concepts see e.g., (Jovanovic, 1982), (Lucas, 1978, 1967), (Mansfield, 1962), for
review on the subject see (Sutton, 1997).
9 Hall (1987) and Evans (1987a,b) estimate the growth equation together with the survival equa-
tion by maximum likelihood estimation. Dunne et al. (1989) use a different approach. They de-
fine size-age classes and obtain estimates of the distribution of growth rate conditional on
the given size class. Thus they do not need any assumptions on the distribution or the func-
tional form of the firm growth and size, age relationship.where Si,t denotes the size of a firm i in time t, Xi,t is a set of the firm’s cha-
racteristics influencing the firm growth rate, et is the log-normally dis-
tributed error term and d is the length of the measurement period for
the growth rate.10 After simple manipulation11 we arrive at an estimable
form to:
gi,t = lnSi,t–1 + ln Xi, t–1 + ut–1
12 (2)
The major conceptual issues in the econometric part of our analysis are:
i) the treatment of the sample selection problem, ii) the appropriate choice
of estimation framework of fixed versus random effects model; iii) the mo-
deling of a firm’s characteristics effect and choice of a firm’s characteris-
tics.
Panel data is powerful data set under appropriate settings. In the con-
text of the model used with panel data the choice between fixed versus ran-
dom effects setting is essential.13 It has been shown (Hausman, 1978) that
the two methods may result in significantly different results in estimated
parameters when the time dimension is small and number of individuals
is large.14 We are working with data on firms in a transition from a cen-
trally planned economy to a market economy. All these firms started their
operations after 1990 conditionally on a set of initial factors. These effects
represent factors related to the history of previous activities in a centrally
planned system and are at the same time firm specific and fixed. Thus
the following behavior is conditional on initial factors. In this setting
the fixed effects model is relevant.15
A problem arises in the case of dynamic specifications of panel data mo-
dels, which imply inclusion of lagged values of the dependent variable as
explanatory variables. Under such circumstances the usual least square
methods do not lead to consistent estimates in case of fixed effects model.16
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10 Brock and Evans (1986) tested semilog specification and found results similar to these for
the log-log equation.
ln Si,t+d – ln Si,t 11 Equation (1) implies model ––––––––––––– = ln G (Si,t; Xi,t) + ut, where ut is normally dis-
d
tributed with zero mean and possible non-constant variance. Since we use annual growth rate
measure, d = 1.
ln Si,t – ln Si,t–1 12 where from (1) gi,t = –––––––––––––
d
13 Hsiao (1986) summarizes the discussion on fixed versus random effects in a clear way. He
characterizes the two models as conditional inference on the effects that are in the sample (fixed
effects) or unconditional or marginal inference with respect to the population of all effects (ran-
dom effects). The choice between conditional-likelihood function or the marginal-likelihood func-
tion depends on the context of the data, the manner in which it was gathered, and the envi-
ronment from which it came.
14 This the case of the data used for estimation.
15 The random effects are relevant in general if the effects of omitted variables may be sum-
marized by a random variable. The fixed effects on the other hand may be understood as a model
in which the inferences are made conditional on the effects that are in the sample. Considering
the relevance of the random effects model, then initial conditions would be not be that impor-
tant while the individual conditions would have random distribution. This does not apply in our
case.
16 The bias is introduced from the fact that the disturbance terms are serially correlated, caus-
ing the lagged endogenous variable to be correlated with those disturbances.Also themaximum likelihood estimator in thefixed-effect model is no longer
consistent in a typical situation when the time dimension is small and
the number of individuals is large (Anderson – Hsiao, 1982), (Nickell, 1981),
(Sevestre – Trognon, 1992). The remedy for this problem is the usage of
the instrumental variable method, which yields consistent estimates of
the slope coefficients.17 There are other approaches18 and the particular
choice of instruments depends on thesetting of themodel and circumstances
of data. Our model does not explicitly include exogenous explanatory vari-
ables, but these may be used as instruments19 based on the existence of
a general production function.
In order to assess the role of ownership and type of incorporation we es-
timate the growth model for sub-samples defined according to the respec-
tive ownership form and type of incorporation.20 We can then test for the dif-
ference in the slope coefficients in the respective categories. We define
11 categories of different ownership forms and corporate structures.21
The combination of the two characteristics is based on the fact that they
are interrelated. Especially the privatization projects explicitly implied cer-
tain groupings.22
The sample selection problem is specific as many of the entries/exits are
of a spurious character. The process of firm entry and exit is a caveat of vir-
tually all studies based on large panel data. It is troublesome to follow afirm
that drops out of data for other reasons than bankruptcy. Firms which drop
out from/in data from other reasons leading to administrative change of
their identifier in the data represent spurious exits/entries. Not distin-
guishing such spurious entries and exits in empirical analysis may lead to
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17 Balestra and Nerlove (1966) proposed using two stage least square type of estimation using
as a basis for instruments current and lagged values of exogenous explanatory variables. Fi-
nally not the instrumental variables themselves are used as instruments but their differences
from their individual means.
18 Another approach is to write model in the first differences. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) pro-
pose using under this setting for instrumental variables either second lag of the endogenous
variable (supposing the model contains first lag on the right hand side) and first differences be-
tween the exogenous explanatory variables. Another modification they propose instead of the se-
cond lag of endogenous variables to use the first differences, i.e. difference between second and
third lag. Obviously here one has to sacrifice one time dimension. For other approaches see e.g.
(Arrelano, 1989).
19 For instruments we are using the current and lagged value of sales, sectoral measure of mar-
ket concentration and unemployment capturing the regional specific effects. We are using ave-
rage values of variables from firms in the nearest industries, based on two-digit sectoral clas-
sification to account for idiosyncracies of the underlying production technology (Basu – Estrin
– Svejnar, 1997), (Zellner – Kmenta – Dreze, 1966). To capture thechange in theextent of thecon-
centration of a given market defined by a sector, we use sectoral concentration as the instru-
mental variable. The concentration is measured here by the Herfindahl index. For further de-
tails see Appendix.
20 The setting of the fixed effects model obviously does not allow the usage of category variables
on the right-hand-side to analyze the effect of firm characteristics.
21 These categories are identical to those used by Lizal and Svejnar (2002) except that they use
in addition also the category “other”.
22 E.g., one of the possible privatization projects (participating in the voucher privatization)
would involve the transfer of the state enterprise to a joint stock company, while the ownership
would remain state. After some period of time ownership would change from state to private
depending on the entrance of the private investor.misinterpretation of data. During aperiod of privatization, theproblem may
be particularly important unless accordingly adjusted for in the data. In
our data the presence of spurious entries and exits is given by the run of
privatization projects. Another way of ad hoc estimating the presence of
spurious entries is to consider the possible number of green field compa-
nies, i.e., the “true” entries. The number of green field companies in indus-
try is in the initial stages of transition typically related to the level of fo-
reign investment in a respective country and varies among the transition
economies. In Slovakia it remains low during the first two stages of tran-
sition and signals that the number of green field companies is also very
low.23 The credit constraints faced by domestic entrepreneurs also nega-
tively influences the entrance of new firms on the domestic market. Entries
in the data are thus connected with previously existing enterprises24 and
are rather aresult of theprivatization of apreviously state owned entreprise
or further changes of ownership and corporate governance structure.25Ana-
logously the firms do not exit data because of bankruptcy26 but because they
are engaged in the process of privatization. Irrespective of the character of
the process of entries and exits, the firm growth rate is observed condi-
tionally on the fact that it remains in data. The probability of this event
is modeled by a Probit model where the latent variable is a function of
a firm’s characteristics. We are not modeling the probability of survival in
the real sense, however, the model is suitable for adjusting the sample se-
lection bias due to spurious entries and exits. This setting is known as a ge-
neralized Tobit model – (Tobin, 1958), for areview on thetopic see (Amemiya,
1984). As a result of the estimation of the survival equation we obtain 
inverse Mill’s ratio. Including this variable into the estimated relationship 
for the firm growth adjusts for the presence of spurious entries and exits.
The firm growth model may be thus formalized as follows.
gi,t =   xi,t +  i,t if z*
i,t > 0 (3)
gi,t = not observed if z*
i,t < 0
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23 While in the first stage of transition the level of FDI is relatively low in all Visegrad coun-
tries with the exception of Hungary (where reforms started before 1990), in the advanced stage
of transition it increases significantly in all countries except Slovakia. In 1998 Slovakia attained
9.8 % FDI that is the smallest figure out of the Visegrad countries and not even half of the ave-
rage of the Visegrad countries. The Czech Republic accounted for 23.9 % FDI and the average
of the Visegrad countries was 21.9 % (WIIW, 2000).
24 The argument is based on the period of analysis and sample used. It would not hold for small
firms and other economic sectors like e.g. services. In the case of industrial firms with more
than 25 employees the empirical evidence strongly supports the conventional knowledge that
important number of exits and entries of these firms are spurious and represent the changes
related to engagement in the privatization process.
25 Due to the relatively short span of time and character of the privatization process, such firms
are more likely cases where organizational/administrative type of restructuring took place to
some extent. This stage of firm restructuring is not necessarily connected with the introduction
of new production or managerial systems that would alter significantly economic behavior of
the entity.
26 State firms being privatized cannot become bankrupt by law. The firms though engage in fol-
lowing stages of privatization after the ownership was changed to private and still may appear
as spurious bankruptcies due to other reasons – see the discussion of spurious exits and entries
in (Studená 2003, Chapter III).The survival variable is z so that27:
zi,t = 1 if z*
i,t > 0 (4)
zi,t = 0 if z*
i,t < 0
The survival model is estimated as:
z*
i,t =  0 +  1 lnSi,t + ( 2lnSi,t–1)2 +  3 ln HCIs,t +  4dummy_State Owned
(5)
+  5dummy_JointStockCpy +  6dummy_CompanyLtd +  7Capi,t + ui,t
The probability that a firm remains in data depends on its current size
(Si,t) quadrate of its lagged size (Si,t–1). The degree of sectoral market con-
centration in sector s (HCIs,t) captures not only the market power but also
sector specific effects related to changes in sectoral structures. The effect of
ownership and type of incorporation is captured by the dummy variables
for the state ownership and corporate forms of a joint stock company and
a limited liability company. Finally the level of capital (Capi,t) is used to ac-
count for firm specific probability of being chosen in the privatization pro-
ject and consequent drop out from data.
The final form of the firm growth relationship28 is defined as:
gi,t =  0,i +  1 lnSi,t–1 +  2(lnSi,t–1)2 +  3lnHCIs,t +  4iMillsi,t + ui,t (6)
where gi,t are annual firm level observations on the growth rate,  0,i are
the individual firm specific fixed effects, HCI represents the degree of
the sectoral concentration29 and iMills is the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio.
This variable is obtained from the survival model estimation.30 Including
the inverse Mill’s ratio as an explanatory variable in the estimated growth
relationship adjusts for the sample selection introduced by the survival ef-
fect. The empirical literature often examines the relationship between
growth rate and age of the firm, e.g. (Evans, 1987a,b), i.e. Xi,t = Agei,t. This
approach is also used in applications on transition economies (Konings,
1997), (Bilsen – Konings, 1998), (Faggio – Konings, 2001). In case of a tran-
sition economy age does not carry the information relevant for the age of
a firm in a market economy. It is more appropriate to think of the firms as
443 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
27 where the related probabilities of a firm presence vs. exclusion from data are defined by:
P(zi,t = 1) =  (  i,t), P(zi,t = 0) = 1 –  (  i,t)
28 See Appendix for the reported results of tests for the model specification.
29 Measure of sectoral concentration, Herfindahl index is defined:
ns yi
HCIS =    i
2;    i = –––
i=1 Y
where  i is the market share of firm from sector s, defined as the share of its production y, on
the total production Y, ns is the number of firms in sector s.
30                                                                             (   i,t) iMillsi,t = –––––––  (   i,t)being at the same starting point in 1990. Hence we assume that age is not
a relevant indicator for explaining the firm growth relationship, as it would
provide spurious results at this stage, and we do not include this variable
in the estimated relationship.31
3. Survival Effect
The survival model is used to adjust the sample selection. The estimated
parameters of the survival model at the same time reveal what was the pat-
tern of changes leading to observed changes in the market structure.
The turnover of firms is already visible from both aggregate figures and de-
scriptive statistics based on our data (see Appendix for  tables A1–A3).
The size categories continue to develop and number of firms increases in
firms with less than 25 employees. The number of large firms is stable and
does not change considerably any more. Within the ownership structure ob-
viously there is a continuing shift from state to private sector. The private
firms are choosing between corporate governance of company with limited
liability and joint stock company. How do these changes reflect in the firm
turnover process and how is this process linked with observed market struc-
ture development?
The results of the estimation of survival model32 yield two straightfor-
ward results. Firstly, state owned firms are the most likely to drop out of
data. State firms are dropping out of the sample as they engage in privati-
zation. Being in the privatization process the state firms change not only
ownership structure33 but also type of incorporation. The firms may have
considerably changed size structure, having broken up into two or more
spin-offs, separating core production facilities from supportive ones.
The spin-offs have new identity and the mother firm often changes identity
too as it is not directly a successor of a previous state firm.
Secondly, the probability of survival increases with firm size for small
firms and decreases with size for larger firms. The market structure litera-
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31 To understand the problem, it is important to take into account the population structure of
firms. There is a number of de novo firms where age is appropriate. In data used here, the num-
ber of these firms is small and especially for the analyzed period it is negligible. In the case of
all the remaining firms the information is ambiguous. The cases of the remaining firms are:
state owned firms, privatized firms, spin-offs from state owned firms (privatized or not). In
the case of privatized firms, there is a different extent of linkage with the previous state owned
firm. Depending on the character of the production, in some firms there could have been intro-
duced new methods of production together with complex restructuring of the production facili-
ties. In some cases the privatized firm would just continue with its prior activities without con-
siderable changes either because it is in a stand-by position until its new owners engage in
the restructuring process or owners are not interested in investment into the firm and perceive
the current activities as satisfactory.
32 See Table A2 in Appendix for the results.
33 Inspection of the data revealed that pure change of ownership does not imply change of iden-
tification number and firm is further observed with new ownership form. On the other hand,
there are virtually no observations on the changes of type of corporate form, while the struc-
ture of firms in data with respect to corporate form changes significantly during the analyzed
period. This implies that changes in corporate form is linked with changes in the identification
of the firm in the sample.ture actually reports opposite effects and thus this need some explanation.
Large firms are less likely to drop out of sample as they have a large mar-
ket share, on the other hand small firms are more likely to fail to remain
on the market or to be absorbed by their competitors. In our data, the small
firms are most likely newly privatized firms as opposed to large firms still
being likely to enter the privatization process. From there the opposite type
of size – survival relationship. The small firms are these that are already pri-
vatized, they behave as competitive firms and make efforts to increase their
market share, hence to remain in the market. The second part of the effect
is specifically linked to the run of the privatization process and explains
the pattern of firm turnover linked to privatization. The large firms are
most likely changing the structure within the privatization and restruc-
turing so that there is no administrative continuity with the previous en-
tity and the original firms seemingly drop out of the sample.
The probability of survival decreases also for firms incorporated as a li-
mited liability companies followed by firms with a corporate structure of
joint stock companies. These effects may be actually further capturing size
effects as companies incorporated as a limited liability companies are smal-
ler and their turnover is in general larger. Also during the respective pe-
riod part of these companies changed corporate structure in favor of a joint
stock company in order to look for investors in the stock market as the credit
from financial institutions is by and large limited for small firms. Finally
joint stock companies exiting are rather the further restructuring within
the privatization process, than firms really exiting the market.
The significance of ownership and corporate form is thus in line with
the process of privatization when the state owned companies drop out of
data during privatization connected with the change of its identification
number. It is likely that many of these dropouts reenter data as a new en-
tity after the change of ownership. Obviously some state owned companies
disappearing from the sample may represent exits though the experience
from Slovak industry for the given period indicates that the share of these
companies is rather small. Similarly the negative size effect for large firms
is rather, than characteristics of large firms, a result related to the specifics
of the privatization process.
4. Firm Growth
The survival analysis confirmed that the process of firm turnover among
industrial large and medium firms is tightly linked with the process of pri-
vatization and restructuring. The firms engage in the process of ownership
transfer and change of governance in relation with the setup of privatiza-
tion process or resulting restructuring. Large firms continue to take part in
de-fragmentation despite a major wave of spin-offs in the preceding years.
In this section we want to discuss the major results of the firm growth
analysis. In the preceding sections we discussed the interest of this ap-
proach in the context of a transition economy. The main issues to be ad-
dressed by the empirical analysis of firm growth determinants may be for-
mulated as follows. Do we observe any specific pattern of firm growth –
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on its performance in terms of growth, or otherwise stated in constituting
a firm’s demand for labor? In particular, what is the role of specific owner-
ship forms, or more specifically, do we find evidence for different patterns
of growth behavior of private or foreign firms? How do different forms of
governance influence a firm’s decision making with respect to demand for
labor? We are interested in the role of market structure, whether we can
see that firms in highly concentrated sectors have more space to grow as
suggested by the market structure literature. A somewhat methodological
but none the less important question is whether the attention paid to
the role of sample selection was appropriate. Finally, we shall see how
the results of our analysis correspond to evidence from other transitional
economies.
4.1 Size Effect and Firm Characteristics
The answer to the first question with respect to the relationship between
firm growth and its size is negative. In general, the pooled regression does
not reveal a firm growth – firm size relationship (see Table 1 for estimated
coefficients). Hence the empirical results do not provide evidence for a sys-
tematic relationship between firm growth and firm size for medium and
large industrial firms.
The next issue concerns the role of a firm’s characteristics such as owner-
ship form or corporate governance structure in determining the pattern of
firm growth relationship. It must be stressed here, that the estimation
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TABLE 1 Firm Growth. Fixed Effects IV Estimates of Firm Growth Equation
Slovak industry, > 24 employees, 1993–1996, unbalanced four-year panel 1993–1996
(Dependent variable is the logarithm of the annual growth rate of the employment level.)
Estimated coefficient All State/  State/ Private/ Private/ Foreign/ Coope- Foreign/ Private/ State/ Mixed/ Mixed/
firms SOE Joint Joint Ltd. Ltd. rate/ Joint Indi- Ltd. Joint Ltd.
stock stock com- com- Coope- stock vidual com- stock com-
Cpy. Cpy. pany pany rate Cpy. pany Cpy. pany
Log(Employmenty–1) –0,11 0,14 –1,89 1,70b –0,92c 0,24 0,51 0,82 0,32 0,90a –0,01 –0,28
Standard error 0,35 0,48 1,61 0,69 0,53 0,36 0,34 0,66 0,28 0,31 0,41 0,33
[Log(Employmenty–1)]2 0,00 –0,04 0,17 –0,16a 0,10 –0,03 –0,05 –0,12c –0,04 –0,11a 0,01 0,01
Standard error 0,03 0,05 0,16 0,06 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,06 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,03
Log(HCI) 0,53 4,71a 5,18c –2,39a –0,31 1,00b –0,98 –0,78 0,61c –0,89 –0,42 0,80
Standard error 0,40 1,67 2,81 0,88 0,64 0,44 0,75 1,69 0,36 0,72 2,07 0,95
Mills ratio 0,54a 4,70a 3,29c –0,91b 0,20 0,38 –1,90c –1,06c 0,17b –0,09 –0,66 0,62
Standard error 0,20 0,87 1,94 0,44 0,13 0,24 1,08 0,55 0,09 0,20 0,57 0,38
Adjusted R 2 0.24 0.31 0.18 0.39 –0.23 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.52 0.89 0.41 0.17
Number 3682 473 247 800 1165 344 316 98 74 26 68 68
of observations
Number of firms 1718 243 109 333 590 185 111 40 38 16 29 32
Note: a, b, c – statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% test level, respectivelyframework we use does not allow us to inquire whether firms with certain
types of ownership or corporate governance outperform others in the pace
of growth. However, it is possible to inquire about the character of the firm
growth size relationship, i.e., whether in general the firm characteristics
matter in the process of growth. This is the point of running individual re-
gressions for particular ownership forms and types of corporate gover-
nance.
The regressions for some categories do reveal size effects. It is though 
noticeable that when inspecting the signs of coefficients of the labor and 
its quadratic term representing acceleration effect in case of larger firms,
theresults are qualitatively different. Theexplanation for this needs acloser
look at the construction of individual regressions. There are eleven sepa-
rate groups defined for specific ownership forms and corporate governance
structure of firms.34 Size effects are present in two out of three categories
of private ownership, and one foreign ownership category.35 There are two
categories of firms incorporated as joint stock companies, one category of
firms is in private ownership and one in foreign ownership. Foreign owner-
ship is frequently considered as a special form of private ownership. There-
fore it is plausible to look at both categories together. The privately and fo-
reign owned joint stock companies exhibit inverse firm growth – size
relationship.36 This finding is consistent with existing evidence from de-
veloped economies that smaller firms grow faster than larger firms.37 Jo-
vanovic (1982) provides the theoretical framework for this, explaining
the pattern of inverse firm growth size relationship. He proposed a selec-
tion mechanism, where firms have different levels of efficiency and this in-
fluences their survival probability as well as potential to grow. Firms do not
know their efficiency level and learn about it after entering themarket (from
there a learning model). Only the efficient ones remain and outperform
the others. This mechanism actually also well suits the scenario of private
joint stock companies which are mostly privatized previously state owned
firms. All firms actually “enter” the market as private joint stock compa-
nies after privatization. Their new owners have bid for them based on theex-
pectation of their efficiency or possible returns. Based on non-existence of
both of this type of ownership and corporate governance in preceding years,
the firms are likely to lack or have incomplete information about their ef-
ficiency under the new structure. They are also similarly unfamiliar with
the new market environment. In this situation, firms are in the same situ-
ation of not knowing their efficiencies unless starting to operate in the mar-
ket within a new structure. The new structure of a firm is here understood
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34 See Table 2 in Appendix for definition of individual categories and distribution of firms within
these categories.
35 The size effect is also present in one category of public ownership. It contains twenty six pub-
licly owned companies incorporated as limited liability companies. The number of firms is so
small and the combination of corporate form and ownership so particular and unusual that we
would hardly look for some meaningful interpretation.
36 However, the coefficient for employment term for foreign owned joint stock companies is only
significant at 30% significance level.
37 Evidence also that small firms are less likely to survive. Due to different meaning of the sur-
vival model used here, comparison on this issue is not relevant.as change in firm structure resulting from e.g.: ownership change, intro-
duction of new corporate governance, combination of the preceding two, re-
structuring of production facilities usually following one of three preceding
etc. Contrary to the mechanism in a developed economy, in case of a tran-
sition economy, the effect may only be temporary if it is related purely to
uncertainty about the market environment and or uncertainty about
a firm’s efficiency in the new environment and/or within the new structure
as explained above. The presence of a similar pattern of inverse firm growth
– firm size relationship favors explanation within the Jovanovic learning
mechanism. On the other hand, other private firms incorporated as limited
liability companies do not support this type of behavior whereas they should
be facing the same type of uncertainty. Specificity of effect for a type of go-
vernance, in this case, a joint stock company, signals that what we observe
may still be the temporary effects of exogenous factors related to privati-
zation. Joint stock companies were established in the very beginning of
the privatization process prior to the transfer of ownership from the state.
So large private joint stock companies may represent these firms in the ini-
tial stages of restructuring following privatization. These firms typically did
not start to adjust employment stock before the final ownership change took
place. Despite continuing privatization, increases in the number of firms
incorporated as joint stock companies is already generated in the context
of standard market development as we know it from developed economies.
Many firms that entered the market as private firms incorporated as limi-
ted liability companies later transferred to joint stock companies mainly to
obtain access to capital through public stock offerings. It is hard to distin-
guish the prevailing nature of the size effect at this point.
For private companies incorporated as limited liability companies we ob-
serve a negative relationship between firm growth and size. This is rather
counterintuitive in terms of market structure development in standard mar-
ket economies. We expected either firm growth irrespective of size or in-
verse firm growth firm size relationship, i.e., increasing growth for small
companies that reflect the process of growth of entries catching up with
existing large firms that are then growing at a slower rate. The negative
relationship between firm growth and size means that after reaching some
growth rate that is captured by the fixed effect the firm size decreases. In
particular case the entries in industry in the underlying period reflect pri-
vatized firms that have mostly left their employment stock unchanged prior
to realized changes in ownership. The fact that the sizes shrink in general
in the category of privately owned firms incorporated as limited liability
companies reflects therefore the adjustment of employment stock to com-
petitive levels. In addition to that a share of firms with potential to grow
change the corporate governance of a limited liability company to that of
a joint stock company. More specifically, as seen in the survival analysis
firms incorporated as limited liability companies are most likely to drop out
from data. The firms drop out of data as a consequence of change in corpo-
rate governance in favor of joint stock firm structure in order to obtain ac-
cess to capital. Very limited access to financial capital from financial in-
stitutions supports this factor. This explanation is consistent also with
behavior of foreign firms incorporated as limited liability companies. There
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size. Foreign companies more likely contain entries of the “green field” type,
and have access to financial capital via owners therefore they are not forced
to look for means among investors in financial markets.
4.2 Market Characteristics
The market structure characteristics are captured in the estimated rela-
tionship by the variable of sectoral concentration known as Herfindahl con-
centration ratio. The estimated coefficient for this variable is significant for
most regressions. However the sign of coefficient varies across ownership
and corporate governance categories. The market structure literature pre-
dicts the positive effect of high concentration on growth – positive sign of
the coefficient. However we obtain a negative coefficient of market concen-
tration for private companies incorporated as limited liability companies.
This is one of the largest categories in terms of number of firms and share
on industrial employment. At the same time for this category we observe
a negative relationship between firm growth and firm size. Since the con-
centration ratio is sector specific, it is in this case further adjusting for
the effect of large firms in highly concentrated sectors downsizing after pri-
vatization or otherwise stated, adjusting for distortions introduced by labor
hoarding from the past.
Sample selection correction confirms that it is an important issue in
the underlying analysis. The coefficient on the Mills ratio, the variable that
adjusts for sample selection in the estimated relationship, is a significant
variable both in the pooled regression as well as in most regressions in in-
dividual categories of firms.
Concluding on the pattern of the firm growth – firm size relationship, em-
pirical analysis based on medium and large industrial firms did not provide
evidence for any form of systematic relationship between firm size and firm
growth. Neither was confirmed the general role of ownership or specific
form of corporate governance in determining the character of firm growth
– firm size relationship. The present effects are by and large related to par-
ticular events of privatization and related restructuring and in general to
structural shifts adjusting for distortions inherited from past. On the other
hand, the character of size effect revealed in regression for foreign and pri-
vately owned firms incorporated as joint stock companies do signal possible
tendency for inverse relationship of firm growth and size.
4.3 Firm Growth and Transition to a Market Economy
Putting the results in the context of existing evidence for transitional
economies we have found similar tendencies, though since we use different
methodological settings the comparison is not straightforward. Empirical
works analyzing firm growth in transition economies (see Table 2) find evi-
dence for superior behavior of private firms in terms of firm growth with
special emphasis on distinguishing the private ownership that represents
the efficient sector of the economy as opposed to e.g. only technical priva-
tized old companies prior to restructuring. As we have shown we have fo-
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ship within particular ownership and corporate governance form. We have
found that small private and foreign joint stock companies grow faster while
large firms grow slower. Unfortunately, at this point it is not possible to con-
clude on the character of the observed pattern. In particular, we cannot rule
out the possibility that the observed pattern is related to the exogenous set-
ting of theprivatization. At this point themethodological approach is aques-
tion of interest. It is known that random effects versus fixed effects model
specification yield qualitatively different results (Hausman, 1978). While
we are using the fixed effects model specification, other studies are based
on the random effects model. Thorough examination of the model choice im-
plications in a cross-country estimation would probably be the appropriate
setting to address the importance of model selection for the firm growth re-
lationship.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this article is to empirically investigate firm behavior in
terms of the relationship between a firm’s growth and its size. Among other
possible determinants of firm growth we specifically focus on the role of
ownership and corporate form and degree of market concentration.
Analyzing the survival process of firms, we found that the probability that
a firm remains in data increases with size for small firms and decreases
with size for large firms. This result is explained by the specific events re-
lated to privatization. While small firms represent newly privatized com-
petitive firms, large firms are the only ones to engage in privatization.
The large firms are thus likely to drop out of data due to events related to
privatization and restructuring. The level of market concentration has
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TABLE 2 Examples of Empirical Evidence on Firm Growth in Transition Economies
Study Countries Firm  growth: git vs. size, Sample characteristics
covered ownership and other effects
(Konings et  Poland git ↓ with size Industrial firms > 5 employees,
al., 1996) 1988–1991 git ↑ higher for private firms continuing firms
(Bilsen – Bulgaria, git higher for de novo private  stratified samples robust
Konings, 1998) Hungary, firms regression
Romania Nobs: B(95), H(76), R(85)
1991, 1994
(Faggio –  Bulgaria, git depends on ownership: medium and large firms, manu-
Konings, 2001) Estonia, Poland, git lower for state firms facturing and non-manufacturing
Slovenia git higher for foreign firms (P, H) sector
1993–1997 git ↓ with initial size Nobs: B(4679), E(535), P(738),
Romania git ↑ with trade orientation  R(5203), S(1482)
1994–1997 in the early stage 
of transition
This study Slovakia git ↑ with size for small private medium and large firms,
1993–1996 joint stock companies Slovak industry, Nobs (3682)
git ↓ with size for large private 
or foreign joint stock 
companiesa positive effect on the probability of survival. In line with intuition,
the ownership and corporate form play a role, when state owned companies
are the most likely to drop out of data. The probability of dropping out in-
creases for firms incorporated as joint stock companies and limited liabi-
lity companies. Overall the survival model captures very well the process
of firm turnover related to events taking place in a given period. The em-
pirical analysis revealed that attention paid to the sample selection prob-
lem was appropriate as the coefficient for variable adjusting for sample se-
lection is significant in all regressions. The market structure also plays
an important role in the firm growth estimation, though it may capture sec-
tor specific effects at this point.
The analysis of firm growth –  firm size relationship based on medium
and large industrial firms did not provide evidence for any form of syste-
matic relationship between firm size and firm growth. Neither was it con-
firmed that ownership form or specific type of corporate governance deter-
mine the character of firm growth – firm size relationship. We do observe
firm growth – firm size effects for firms with particular forms of ownership
and corporate structure. More specifically, privately and foreign owned
small firms grow faster compared to larger ones. Carefully analyzing
the character of these effects, we find that they are by and large related to
particular events of privatization. On the other hand, private firms incor-
porated as limited liability companies exhibit a negative relationship be-
tween a firm’s growth and its size. This counterintuitive result is explain-
able by the process of restructuring adjusting for distortions inherited from
the past. While it is not possible to exclude that character of size effect re-
vealed in regression for foreign and privately owned firms incorporated as
joint stock companies is transitory, it is a question to be raised and con-
firmed by extending the analysis over the following years. When compar-
ing the results with other transitional economies, we find similar patterns
but conclude these are more likely to be transitory than represent true own-
ership or corporate governance effects.
APPENDIX
Estimation Details and Specification Tests
As already discussed the estimation results in the panel setting are very sensitive
to the specification. We have run the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978)
for the validity of random vs. fixed effects specification and we have rejected the null
hypothesis that the random effects are valid. Indeed the estimated coefficients in
the fixed effects and random effects model varied considerably also in magnitude as
well as signs of the coefficients that underlines the importance of appropriate set-
tings.
The second important issue is thepresence of heteroscedasticity. We treat this prob-
lem using a robust regression yielding heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors.
Finally we have accounted for the problem of autocorrelation. This occurred in
the setting with quarterly observations on annual growth rates. We had to reject
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blem using the first difference problem but this specification was not a remedy for
autocorrelation in our data. Therefore we had to remain with annual observations
only loosing thus about two thirds of the number of observations. In this setting
we could finally reject the presence of autocorrelation.
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TABLE A1 Size Structure of Industry
Number of Firms Employment
no. of empl.
1993 1994 1995 1996
no. of empl.
1993 1994 1995 1996 in the firm in the firm
[%] of total [%] of total
25–99 38 42 47 50 25–99 5 7 8 9
100–249 29 28 27 26 100–249 11 13 14 14
250–499 17 15 13 12 250–499 14 15 14 15
500–999 8 7 6 5 500–999 13 14 13 12
>1000 9 8 7 6 >1000 55 52 51 50
Total 100 100 100 100 Total 100 100 100 100
Total number  1 289 1 452 1 622 1 731 Total 522837 509902 519767 507892
of firms [no. of empl.]
TABLE A3 Corporate Structure of Industry
Number of Firms Employment
Corporate 
1993 1994 1995 1996
Corporate 
1993 1994 1995 1996 structure structure
[%] of total [%] of total
Cooperative 9 8 7 7 Cooperative 4 4 4 4
Ltd. company 33 44 50 54 Ltd. company 14 19 23 25
Entrepreneur 3 2 2 2 Entrepreneur 1 1 1 1
Joint stock cpy. 29 29 31 32 Joint stock cpy. 38 47 53 60
State enterprise 26 17 10 5 State enterprise 43 29 20 10
Total 100 100 100 100 Total 100 100 100 100
Total number  1 289 1 452 1 622 1 731 Total [no. 522837 509902 519767 507892
of firms of empl.]
TABLE A2 Ownership Structure of Industry
Number of Firms Employment
Ownership 1993 1994 1995 1996 Ownership 1993 1994 1995 1996
[%] of total [%] of total
Foreign 8 12 14 14 Foreign 4 9 10 11
Private 40 60 65 70 Private 14 40 48 53
State 52 28 20 16 State 82 51 42 35
Total 100 100 100 100 Total 100 100 100 100
Total number  1 289 1 452 1 621 1 731 Total [no. 522837 509902 519767 507892
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TABLE A4 Distribution of Firms in Defined Ownership/Legal Form Categories
Number of Firms
All State/ State/ Private/ Private/ Foreign/ Coope- Foreign/ Private/ State/ Mixed/ Mixed/
firms SOE Joint Joint Ltd. Ltd. rate/ Joint Indivi- Ltd. Joint Ltd.
stock stock com- com- Coope- stock dual com- stock com-
Cpy. Cpy. pany pany rate Cpy. pany Cpy. pany
1993 1289 329 269 56 309 74 116 22 34 11 31 36
1996 1731 92 118 365 698 205 113 40 39 12 27 20
Note: Category of individual entrepreneurs with foreign ownership was not inspected individually as they are only
2 such entities, these were though included in the regression with all firms.
TABLE A5 Survival Equation
Dependent variable = 1 for firms that drop out of data, probit model estimates.
Slovak industry, > 24 employees, 1993–1996, unbalanced four-year pooled data 1993–1996.
Estimated coefficient* Standard error




Level of fixed assets –0.14 0.006
Ownership dummy variables:
State 0.72 0.02
Corporate form dummy variables:
Joint stock company 0.14 0.02
Ltd. company 0.30 0.03
Number of observations 14 517
Note * All estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1% test level.REFERENCES
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SUMMARY
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Firm Growth in Advanced Stages of Economic
Transition: Evidence from Slovak Industry
Ivana STUDENÁ – Institute for Forecasting, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava (progstud@savba.sk;
ivana.studena@cerge-ei.cz)
This article analyzes the reaction of firms to transition in adjusting firm size. 
The author offers an empirical analysis in the context of the firm-growth model with
emphasis on the presence of ownership and corporate-structure effects.
There is no evidence for a general firm-growth/firm-size relationship. On the other
hand, the author finds evidence that firm growth is a function of size for firms of
a particular type. Specifically, there is an inverse growth-size relationship for pri-
vately owned joint-stock companies. Examining the character of these effects, the
author concludes that their character is transitory: It corresponds to events related
to exogenous settings of economic privatization and the economic restructuring pro-
cess rather than tangible ownership or corporate-governance effects.
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